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This review focuses on the issue of how neuroimaging studies address theoretical accounts
of reasoning, through the lens of the method of forward inference (Henson, 2005, 2006).
After theories of deductive and inductive reasoning are briefly presented, the method of for-
ward inference for distinguishing between psychological theories based on brain imaging
evidence is critically reviewed. Brain imaging studies of reasoning, comparing deductive
and inductive arguments, comparing meaningful versus non-meaningful material, investi-
gating hemispheric localization, and comparing conditional and relational arguments, are
assessed in light of the method of forward inference. Finally, conclusions are drawn with
regard to future research opportunities.
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How can neuroimaging techniques help address theoretical ques-
tions in reasoning research? To be more specific, how can tech-
niques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
help researchers distinguish between psychological theories of rea-
soning? There have been thousands of behavioral experiments on
reasoning, and the field as a whole has several competing theories
without a consensus of which one best account for the behavioral
data. Potentially, new evidence on patterns of brain activity during
reasoning tasks could help resolve these long-standing debates.
This article will first briefly outline several psychological the-
ories of deductive and inductive reasoning. Next, a particular
method (forward inference; Henson, 2005, 2006) for using neu-
roimaging data to test predictions from psychological theories will
be critically discussed. Then, example neuroimaging studies of
deductive and inductive reasoning will be reviewed, through the
lens of the method of forward inference. By no means is forward
inference the only possible means to advance psychological theory
in the context of neuroimaging. This exercise will provide some
perspective both on neuroimaging studies of reasoning and on the
method of forward inference.
THEORIES OF REASONING
Researchers have studied reasoning on both problems of deduc-
tion and problems of induction. Problems of deduction require
drawing a valid, logical conclusion that must follow based on a
set of given premises. In contrast, problems of induction require
drawing probabilistic conclusions from given information as well
as other relevant knowledge (Heit, 2007; Hayes et al., 2010).
One open question in reasoning research is whether deduction
and induction simply refer to two different kinds of reasoning
problems – in terms of the structure and/or content of the
problems themselves – or if there are truly two different kinds
of reasoning, deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning, with
different cognitive processes (or different mixtures of cognitive
processes) involved (Rotello and Heit, 2009; Heit and Rotello,
2010; Heit et al., 2012).
According to dual-process accounts [e.g., Kahneman (2011),
Evans and Stanovich (2013)], there are two kinds of underly-
ing mechanisms, heuristic processing and analytic processing.
Both induction and deduction could be influenced by these two
processes, but in different mixtures (Rotello and Heit, 2009; Heit
and Rotello, 2010; Heit et al., 2012). Under this mixture account,
induction judgments could be particularly influenced by heuristic
processes that tap into associations and knowledge that do not nec-
essarily make an argument logically valid. In contrast, deduction
judgments could be more heavily influenced by slower analytic
processes that encompass more deliberative, and typically more
accurate, reasoning. However, for present purposes, the crucial
point is that there are two processes, not the details of any possible
mixture.
In comparison, single-process accounts explain reasoning in
terms of a common set of mechanisms across multiple forms of
reasoning, although typically these theories focus more on either
deduction or induction. Mental model theory (Johnson-Laird,
1994) asserts that a reasoner assesses an argument by constructing
a visuospatial model of the premises then looking for counterex-
amples. Although this theory is typically applied to problems of
deduction, it has also been applied to problems of induction.
Bayesian accounts of reasoning address performance on prob-
lems of deduction in terms of making probabilistic judgments
(Oaksford and Chater, 2007); hence, they are inductive in nature.
Indeed, related models of inductive reasoning are also Bayesian
in nature (Heit, 1998; Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001). Addi-
tionally, there are some models of inductive reasoning (Osherson
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et al., 1990; Sloman, 1993) that focus on problems of induction
but can address performance on some problems of deduction as
well. Finally, mental logic theory (Rips, 1994; Braine and O’Brien,
1998) has focused on deduction, asserting that people reason on
problems of deduction by carrying out syntactic operations using
a system of logical rules.
DRAWING THEORETICAL INFERENCES
Although there has been skepticism about drawing inferences
about psychological theories from neuroimaging data [e.g., Colt-
heart (2006), Harley (2004), Uttal (2011), Van Orden and Paap
(1997)]. Henson (2005, 2006) has outlined a rationale for doing
so, adopting standard notions from experimental psychology on
employing behavioral data. Henson (2006) referred to this process
as “forward inference,” namely, “the use of qualitatively different
patterns of activity over the brain to distinguish between compet-
ing cognitive theories.” The key idea is that if theory 1 predicts that
the same cognitive processes underlie two different experimental
tasks, and theory 2 predicts that the tasks differ in terms of at least
one cognitive process, then theory 2 will be supported when pat-
terns of brain activity differ between the two tasks. This inference
depends on the assumption that there is at least some systematic
mapping between cognitive processes and brain regions, namely,
the weak assumption that within the experimental comparison of
interest, the same cognitive process is not supported by different
brain regions.
Forward inference itself has some limitations, such as its asym-
metrical nature, that is, theory 1 can be supported by null results,
whereas theory 2 could potentially be supported numerous dif-
ferences. Also, as Henson (2006) noted, forward inferences are
theory-dependent, namely, theories 1 and 2 may both be incorrect,
and some alternative account such as theory 3 may be correct. If
that alternative is not considered by the researcher, then forward
inferences based on theories 1 and 2 will be misleading. Another
pitfall is that there can be other reasons for differences in localiza-
tion, namely, if two experimental tasks differ in patterns of brain
activity, the reason may not be differences in cognitive processes
but differences in rate of responding “yes” [Nosofsky et al. (2012);
for a related argument, involving task complexity, see Johnson
(1993)]. Going beyond the issue of which regions are activated
is the matter of how these activations are causally related to each
other [e.g., Chiong et al. (2013)]. In general, as Monti and Osher-
son (2012) point out, reasoning“should be regarded as a collection
of processes and representations” [cf., Anderson (1978)], hence
observed differences may correspond not to processing differences
but differences in the content being processed.
A more fundamental problem for forward inference is that
the theories of interest simply may not make predictions about
brain activity. In Marr’s (1982) terms, the theories may be at the
algorithmic or computational level of description, without strong
connections to the implementation level. Henson (2005) was opti-
mistic, however, that brain imaging could either directly address
the algorithmic level of processing or do so indirectly, by illumi-
nating the implementation level which itself would constrain the
algorithmic level.
A companion article to Henson (2006), by Poldrack (2006),
described “reverse inference,” by which the presence of a particular
cognitive process is inferred from a pattern of brain activity [see
Del Pinal and Nathan (2013), for a critical review]. Poldrack
noted that a researcher’s confidence in a reverse inference can
be explained in terms of Bayes’s Theorem, with the conditional
probability that the cognitive process is engaged when a particular
brain region is activated depending, in part, on the prior likeli-
hood that cognitive process appears in the experimental context.
Put another way, if the cognitive process is implausible in absolute
terms, then the researcher should not be greatly confident that it is
tied to any particular brain region. This point echoes the situation
in forward inference that if two theories being compared are both
incorrect, then imaging results could only give misleading support
for one over the other. The conditional probability also depends
on the selectivity of the brain region. For example, if the brain
region is so large that it is activated by many cognitive processes,
then it will be difficult to infer the engagement of any one process
when the region is activated.
Although reverse inference is not used to directly compare the-
ories, it is a part of the scientific process that could be used to
develop theories. Moreover, Poldrack’s (2006) Bayesian formu-
lation of reverse inference inspires a Bayesian generalization of
forward inference, as shown in Eq. 1.
P
(
theory1|results
)
= P
(
results| theory1
)
P(theory1)
P
(
results| theory1
)
P(theory1)+ P
(
results| theory2
)×
P(theory2)+ . . .+ P
(
results| theoryn
)
P(theoryn)
(1)
Here, the conditional probability that theory 1 is correct after
observing a set of neuroimaging results depends on the conditional
probability of the results under that theory, as well as the prior like-
lihood of the theory. This probability must be normalized in terms
of the likelihood of other, competing theories. Forward inference
is a special case with two theories and the observed results being
either the same pattern of brain activity across two experimental
tasks or different patterns of brain activity.
PREDICTIONS ABOUT BRAIN ACTIVITY
Next, several examples of neuroimaging studies of reasoning, aim-
ing to address theoretical views, will be reviewed in the light of the
method of forward inference.
DEDUCTION VERSUS INDUCTION
At least one of the contrasts made in imaging research on reason-
ing is a good example of forward inference. Several studies (Goel
et al., 1997; Osherson et al., 1998; Parsons and Osherson, 2001;
Goel and Dolan, 2004) have compared deductive and inductive
reasoning tasks. One class of theories (including mental model
theory and Bayesian accounts) has suggested that deduction and
induction are performed by a common set of processes. Another
class of theories (dual-process theories) has suggested that there
are two types of underlying mechanisms of reasoning, heuristic
and analytic processing, which would contribute differentially to
deduction and induction. To the extent that different patterns of
brain activity are observed for deduction versus induction tasks,
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holding everything else equal between experimental conditions, by
forward inference, dual-process accounts will be supported over
single-process alternatives. (Note that three of these studies, all but
Goel and Dolan, 2004, used exactly the same materials for the two
conditions, but simply asked a deduction question or an induction
question.) Indeed, these four studies all found somewhat different
patterns of brain activation for deduction versus induction. Three
of these studies (Goel et al., 1997; Osherson et al., 1998; Goel and
Dolan, 2004) found increased activation for induction, relative to
deduction, in left frontal cortex, although in somewhat different
regions at a finer level. Although it would be valuable to have an
understanding of why the regions differ between studies, which is
not crucial for the method of forward inference.
Overall, these results do make a good case for dual-process the-
ories over single-process theories, notwithstanding the limitations
of forward inference described above. To accommodate, these
results would require single-process theories to assume some-
what different processes for deduction versus induction, e.g., to
become more like dual-process theories. In a related line of work
Houdé et al. (2000, 2001) compared brain activity before and after
a training session aimed at improving logical reasoning, rather
than comparing reasoning under two sets of instructions. In terms
of the method of forward inference, the qualitatively different pat-
terns of activity pre- versus post-training would be a challenge for
single-process accounts, without assuming that deduction before
and after training engages different processes.
MEANINGFUL VERSUS NON-MEANINGFUL MATERIAL
Another contrast is a slightly less clear example of forward infer-
ence. Several studies have varied the content of arguments while
otherwise keeping the task the same, e.g., abstract versus con-
crete materials (Goel et al., 2000; Goel and Dolan, 2001), materials
that agree, disagree, or are neutral with respect to prior knowl-
edge (Goel and Dolan, 2003), and visual versus spatial relations
such as “fatter than” versus “is a descendant of” (Knauff et al.,
2003). To apply forward inference, what is needed is one theory
that predicts the same cognitive processes between conditions, and
another theory that predicts different cognitive processes between
conditions. With regard to the abstract/concrete and prior knowl-
edge studies, the results were greater bilateral parietal activation
for abstract or neutral content, and in two of the studies, greater
left temporal activation for concrete or knowledge-related mate-
rials. With regard to the study on visual versus spatial relations,
the finding was that visual problems led to enhanced activity in
visual association cortex. Although these differences in brain activ-
ity would be consistent with dual-process accounts assuming that
somewhat different mechanisms are employed depending on con-
tent, the problem is that even single-process accounts would need
to make some assumptions to explain how content affects rea-
soning. So it is unclear that single-process accounts are ruled out
[cf., Keren (2013)]. From the perspective of forward inference,
the problem is the lack of well-defined theories making sharply
different predictions.
LEFT VERSUS RIGHT HEMISPHERE
A frequent prediction addressed in brain imaging research on
reasoning is whether the left or right hemisphere is activated.
It is tempting to link mental logic theory, having a proposi-
tional nature, with left hemisphere activation and mental model
theory, having a visuospatial nature, with right hemisphere activa-
tion. Therefore, by looking at which hemisphere is predominantly
activated during a reasoning task, one might see which theory has
greater support. With regard to mental model theory, the origin
of this prediction appears to be Johnson-Laird (1994), and it has
been tested in many studies (Goel et al., 1997, 1998, 2000; Parsons
and Osherson, 2001; Knauff et al., 2002, 2003; Noveck et al., 2004;
Monti et al., 2007, 2009). Although reasoning tasks are typically
associated with left hemisphere activation, the results have actually
been mixed (Goel, 2007), with many studies showing activation in
both hemispheres.
Of greater concern is not the result but the soundness of the
hemispheric prediction. An inference of the form “if theory X is
correct then brain region Y will be activated” is neither forward
inference nor reverse inference. Indeed, no proponent of either
theory of reasoning would likely abandon their beliefs based on
tests of these predictions. Noveck et al. (2004) suggested that no
proponent of mental logic theory has even made predictions about
brain regions. Moreover, the predictions about brain regions are
not unique, e.g., alternative predictions can also be made for men-
tal model theory, such as parietal activation (Knauff et al., 2003) or
activation in the anterior prefrontal cortex (Fangmeier et al., 2006).
Knauff et al. even suggested that left hemisphere activation may
be consistent with mental model theory, because comprehension
of arguments will recruit linguistic areas of the brain.
A final problem with the hemispheric prediction is that it sets
up a comparison between two theories that are not the only pos-
sibilities. In terms of Eq. 1, other theories need to be considered.
For example, the studies reviewed here did not consider Bayesian
accounts of deduction (Oaksford and Chater, 2007), yet these
accounts have amassed a growing set of successes in the domain
of reasoning.
CONDITIONAL VERSUS RELATIONAL ARGUMENTS
Other neuroimaging studies (Knauff et al., 2002; Prado et al., 2010)
have compared reasoning about two types of deduction problems,
conditional (if-then) arguments and relational arguments (e.g.,
regarding relative spatial position). The Knauff et al. study was
largely concerned with hemispheric predictions comparing men-
tal model and mental logic theory. There were some differences
in activation when comparing the two argument types; however,
these differences were bilateral and not interpreted strongly. Prado
et al. were more directly interested in comparing the two argu-
ment types, and indeed observed that the left inferior frontal
gyrus is activated more for conditional arguments and the right
temporo-parieto-occipital region is activated more for spatial
arguments. These results were interpreted as evidence against
“unitary” accounts of deduction and evidence for “fractionated”
accounts of deduction. To the extent that unitary views predict
that the same cognitive processes are used for the two tasks, and
fractionated views predict that different processes are used, this
is a good example of forward inference. Prado et al. took a par-
ticularly nuanced approach, pointing out that although mental
model and mental logic theory can be treated as unitary accounts,
it is possible to imagine “hybrid” versions predicting somewhat
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2015 | Volume 8 | Article 1056 | 3
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heit Brain imaging and reasoning theories
different cognitive processes depending on argument type. Hence,
the results are useful in ruling out basic versions of single-process
accounts of reasoning. However, the problem, in terms of forward
inference and Eq. 1, is that multiple theories of the fractionated
type, which is multiple theories that predict that different processes
will underlie different problems, are still possible. So there is neg-
ative evidence against some theories but the distinctive, positive
evidence for other theories is less clear.
For further discussion, including a meta-analysis of brain imag-
ing studies across argument types and presentation modalities, see
Prado et al. (2011) for an extended argument that deductive rea-
soning is better described in terms of multiple systems than a single
mechanism.
CONCLUSION
Just as researchers spell out all of the methodological details of
brain imaging studies, it is valuable when researchers spell out
the details of their own reasoning, e.g., list alternative theories,
give sources for predictions, examine alternative predictions, and
explain the rationale of testing predictions. The method of forward
inference is one such rationale, although as discussed, it is not with-
out its own limitations. This review of brain imaging studies of rea-
soning has shown that some comparisons, namely, deduction ver-
sus induction and conditional arguments versus relational argu-
ments, have made profitable use of forward inference. The possible
theoretical contributions of other studies reviewed here appears
to lie outside of forward inference, likely reflecting limitations of
forward inference as well as cases where the studies need a more
fully spelled-out rationale for making theoretical comparisons.
Looking to the future, another approach with great promise
is to combine neuroimaging with mathematical modeling, to
test well-specified psychological theories. Indeed, some meth-
ods of combining neuroimaging and modeling can be seen as
extensions or generalizations of the method of forward infer-
ence, providing alternative methods for distinguishing between
psychological processing accounts using neuroimaging data. For
example, rather than comparing a single-process account to a
dual-process account, McClure et al. (2007) implemented a mix-
ture model comprising two processes, with the aim of linking
model parameters to localized brain activity. Staresina et al.
(2013) used the method of state-trace analysis to look for non-
monotonic patterns of brain activity across experimental con-
ditions that would rule out single-process accounts. Mack et al.
(2013) compared patterns of brain activation to latent model
representations for competing psychological models, assessing
the match between brain activity and model predictions across
multiple experimental manipulations. Finally, Rotello and Heit
(2014) reinterpreted brain imaging studies of conflicts between
prior beliefs and deductive reasoning, seeming to show multiple
reasoning processes, using an algebraic analysis based on signal
detection theory.
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